32 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
32 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
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# HYBX OMNL — external audit checklist
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Use this with a third-party firm before high-value production. Scope aligns with [SECURITY_THREAT_MODEL.md](SECURITY_THREAT_MODEL.md).
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## Solidity (in scope)
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- [ ] `PolicyMath.sol` — rounding, overflow, parameter bounds vs documented policy.
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- [ ] `InstrumentRegistry.sol` — role changes, line lifecycle, token registration assumptions.
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- [ ] `ReserveCommitmentStore.sol` — `commitReserve` / `commitReserveAttested`, ECDSA digest, replay, threshold logic.
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- [ ] `ComplianceCore.sol` — `getCompliance` semantics vs `PolicyMath`, stale attestation, `reportingCompliant`.
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- [ ] `OMNLCircuitBreaker.sol` — pause semantics, admin roles.
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- [ ] `OMNLMirrorReceiver.sol` — CCIP payload decoding, selector allowlist, monotonic version.
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- [ ] `OMNLMirrorCoordinator.sol` — native vs ERC-20 fee path, `approve`/`SafeERC20`, reentrancy surface (minimal).
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## Operational evidence to provide auditors
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- [ ] Deployed addresses per chain (138 / 651940) and verification on block explorers.
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- [ ] Key ceremony summary (HSM / multisig); no plaintext prod keys in CI.
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- [ ] CCIP lane configuration (router, selectors, fee token).
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- [ ] Sample `ReserveCommitted` and mirror receive transactions on testnet/staging.
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## Off-chain (optional scope)
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- [ ] Token-aggregation OMNL routes — rate limits, `OMNL_API_KEY` usage, webhook HMAC verification at receivers.
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- [ ] IPSAS registry / journal matrix change control (who can commit, how hash is anchored).
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## Sign-off
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| Finding | Severity | Remediation | Retest date |
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|---------|----------|-------------|-------------|
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