Fix multiple vulnerabilities

This commit is contained in:
Jorge Martins
2022-07-08 11:12:50 +02:00
parent 4eb7109b86
commit e0218520d8
20 changed files with 166 additions and 168 deletions

View File

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ void handleSignEIP712Message(uint8_t p1,
uint16_t dataLength,
unsigned int *flags,
unsigned int *tx) {
uint8_t i;
UNUSED(tx);
if ((p1 != 00) || (p2 != 00)) {
THROW(0x6B00);
@@ -18,31 +16,13 @@ void handleSignEIP712Message(uint8_t p1,
if (appState != APP_STATE_IDLE) {
reset_app_context();
}
if (dataLength < 1) {
PRINTF("Invalid data\n");
THROW(0x6a80);
}
tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.pathLength = workBuffer[0];
if ((tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.pathLength < 0x01) ||
(tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.pathLength > MAX_BIP32_PATH)) {
PRINTF("Invalid path\n");
THROW(0x6a80);
}
workBuffer++;
dataLength--;
for (i = 0; i < tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.pathLength; i++) {
if (dataLength < 4) {
PRINTF("Invalid data\n");
THROW(0x6a80);
}
tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.bip32Path[i] = U4BE(workBuffer, 0);
workBuffer += 4;
dataLength -= 4;
}
if (dataLength < 32 + 32) {
PRINTF("Invalid data\n");
workBuffer = parseBip32(workBuffer, &dataLength, &tmpCtx.messageSigningContext.bip32);
if (workBuffer == NULL || dataLength < 32 + 32) {
THROW(0x6a80);
}
memmove(tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.domainHash, workBuffer, 32);
memmove(tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.messageHash, workBuffer + 32, 32);

View File

@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ unsigned int io_seproxyhal_touch_signMessage712_v0_ok(__attribute__((unused))
PRINTF("EIP712 hash to sign %.*H\n", 32, hash);
io_seproxyhal_io_heartbeat();
os_perso_derive_node_bip32(CX_CURVE_256K1,
tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.bip32Path,
tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.pathLength,
tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.bip32.path,
tmpCtx.messageSigningContext712.bip32.length,
privateKeyData,
NULL);
io_seproxyhal_io_heartbeat();